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UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
WILLIAM W. PARK 
I. LAW AND LAWYERS: THE PROTEAN NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The primordial Greek sea-god Proteus could alter his shape at will, 
notwithstanding that his divine substance remained the same. Reinventing 
himself by adapting to new circumstances, Proteus still stayed unchanged in 
essence. 
Unlike the sea-god’s protean nature, the substance of international law may 
well undergo alterations when examined through the telescope of legal culture, 
or with predispositions of divergent educational backgrounds. For the thoughtful 
reader, scholarly speculation on such variations will be triggered by reading Is 
International Law International?.1 In that book, Professor Anthea Roberts 
explores a variety of elements in the teaching and practice of international law, 
viewed through the lenses of scholars and judges from different parts of the 
world.  
At the outset, Professor Roberts explains that her inquiry relates not to law 
per se, in the sense of legal sources such as treaty and custom. Rather, she looks 
at how various legal communities construct divergent understandings of 
international law, such as to call into question its universality. The 
understandings that remain often perpetuate difference and dominance.2 Thus, 
Russian or Chinese students would be fed a different version of international law 
from the one given to those who have studied and practiced in Boston or Paris. 
Some arbitrators in cross-border investment disputes might be more likely to 
understand international law as taught in Western European or North American 
universities. Students from China and Australia alike might study in Britain or 
the United States, while Russians would remain more insular.  
Professor Roberts focuses on lawyers as much as law, presenting a 
comparison of the “who” as much as the “what.” For example, the 2003 United 
States invasion of Iraq receives a comparison of how the legality of that war gets 
treated in textbooks written by French, American, and British academics.3 The 
author looks not only at academics, but also at judges of different national 
origins sitting on the International Court of Justice, examining inter alia patterns 
of scholarship and effects of technology.4 Language and culture also play roles 
 Professor of Law, Boston University; Former President, London Court of International 
Arbitration; General Editor, Arbitration International. 
1 ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). 
2 Id. at 6-11. 
3 See id. at 199-205. 
4 Id. at 256-60. 
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in the study, with observations on the pervasiveness of textbooks and journals 
in English and French and the location of preeminent universities in Britain, 
France, and the United States.5  
For any careful observers, asking “is international law international?” begs 
prior definitional questions: What is law? And what law gets labelled as 
international? At least in the tradition of Western legal thinking, notions of 
“international law” touched relations among nations, addressing subjects such 
as jurisdiction on the high seas, territorial waters, state succession, treaties, 
military conflict, duties toward neutrals, and state responsibility. When 
Professor Brierly’s now-classic Law of Nations6 first appeared in 1928, these 
“state-to-state” contours of international law had already been ensconced in 
diplomatic and scholarly minds for 170 years, since crystalized in Le droit des 
gens,7 published in 1758 by the Swiss scholar-diplomat Emer de Vattel. 
Concepts of international law evolved, however, to encompass human rights and 
investor protection, with private persons (natural/individual as well as 
corporate/juridical) included as subjects of international law and given new 
perspectives by the great German-British lawyer Francis Mann, who in 1972 
published his Studies in International Law.8 
In parallel, cross-border economic transactions grew in a fashion that fostered 
a professional class trained to tackle questions of “trans-national law” such as 
the resolution of international business disputes and allocation of fiscal 
jurisdiction. Treaties were negotiated to allocate tax jurisdiction and to enforce 
foreign arbitration awards.  
International arbitration, now a key component of any mature law school 
curriculum, evolved to include not only such state-to-state disputes but also 
commercial controversies and claims against sovereign states by foreign 
investors, from alleged wrongs derived from unjustified expropriation, lack of 
fair and equitable treatment, or discrimination.9 Yet international arbitration 
never lost its links to an earlier service dedicated more to state-to-state conflicts. 
These included the Anglo-American disputes addressed by the “Jay Treaty” 
following the American Revolution,10 and the 1872 “Alabama Arbitration” that 
awarded the United States $15.5 million (equivalent to about $200 billion in 
today’s money) for damage to Union shipping during the American Civil War 
caused by a vessel built in Britain and sold to the Southern Confederacy.11  
 
5 Id. at 260-72. 
6 J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1928). 
7 EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1758). 
8 F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
9 Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park,  The New Face of Investment 
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366-68 (2003). 
10 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., art. 6, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 
116 (addressing difficulties from 1783 Treaty of Paris, including damages to British 
creditors).  
11 E.g., Jan Paulsson, The Alabama Claims Arbitration: Statecraft and Stagecraft, in 
ARBITRATING FOR PEACE – HOW ARBITRATION MADE A DIFFERENCE 7 (Ulf Franke, Annette 
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Such diversity, nuance, and evolution should surprise no one. The vastness of 
both “law” as a noun, and “international” as an adjective, suggest that 
international law, and its cognates in languages other than English, tie together 
bundles of norms and moral claims whose common denominator includes an 
authoritative adjudicatory framework for resolving disagreements whose 
elements will cross national boundaries.  
Consequently, courts and arbitrators adjudicating cross-border disputes often 
seek guidance in national as well as international rules, with the line anything 
but impermeable. Damages for breach of obligations arising from a German-
American financial joint venture in Geneva might implicate principles of state 
responsibility, as well as the Swiss Code des obligations, the Massachusetts law 
of contract, and the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Depending on context, 
the dispute’s legal dimensions might bring into play notions such as sovereign 
immunity, Act of State, or treaty-based recognition of arbitral awards as 
expressed in national statutes such as the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act,12 or the 
Swiss doctrine shielding from attachment assets held in Switzerland by foreign 
sovereigns, absent some sufficient “internal” legal link (Binnenbeziehung) 
between Switzerland and either the parties, the transaction, or the subject matter 
of the underlying dispute.13 
In some instances, decision-makers addressing cross-border disputes will 
consult not only law in its traditional formulation (including treaties and prior 
decisions), but also the lore of trade usage and professional associations. The 
latter include associations such as the International Bar Association and the 
International Chamber of Commerce, whose rules are often decisive in 
determining how adjudication of an international dispute will unfold in respect 
of questions such as document production and privilege, which in turn are often 
decisive as to who wins and who loses. Such “soft law’’ formulations of 
normative principles derive legitimacy from their acceptance by the public and 
private actors who participate in transactions having significant components in 
more than one country. 
 
Magnusson & Joel Dahlquist eds, 2016); Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 
54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2005); Van Vechten Veeder, The Historical Keystone to 
International Arbitration: The Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF AM. SOC’Y 
OF INT’L L. 387 (2013); see also Bruno de Loynes de Fumichon & William W. Park,  Retour 
sur l’Affaire de l’Alabama: de l’Utilité et de la Futilité de l’Historie du Droit, REV. ARB. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
12 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
13 The mere fact that the seat of an arbitration might be in Switzerland will not normally 
be considered sufficient. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamarihiya v. Libyan American Oil 
Co. (LIAMCO), Swiss Fed. Supreme Ct., June 19 1980, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 151, 159–60 
(1981) (applying Circulaire du Department Fédéal de Justice et Police, Jurisprudence des 
Autorités Administratives de la Conféderation 224 (Nov. 26, 1979)); see also Georges R. 
Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79 AM. J. INT’L L.319, 340 
(1985). 
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Significant cultural differences in approaching such “soft law” norms, 
procedural and substantive, have led to intriguing debate within the Western 
legal tradition itself. One example derives from the purported lex mercatoria14 
or “international law merchant” whose academic revival a half century ago 
sparked support from the French,15 and skepticism on the part of many in 
Britain,16 while in passing providing younger scholars with the delightful 
prospect of taking sides in the exciting intellectual combat.17 
 
14 See generally Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD 
WILBERFORCE 149 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987); William W. Park, Control 
Mechanisms in the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION 109 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990); Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex 
Mercatoria (Old and New) and the TransLex-Principles, TRANS-LEX: LAW RESEARCH, 
www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria-and-the-translex-principles_ID8 (last visited Mar. 14, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/98AZ-CSWX]. 
15 E.g. Emmanuel Gaillard,  Trente Ans de Lex Mercatoria: Pour une Application Sélective 
de la Méthode des Principes Généraux du Droit, 1995 J. DROIT INT’L 5 (1995); Berthold 
Goldman, Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria, 1964 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 
177 (1964). The content of lex mercatoria related not only to procedural issues in arbitration 
but also to substantive decisions on breach of obligations. See Cour de Cassation 
[Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.) concerning a 
dispute between the French Norsolor and the Turkish Pabalk, with arbitration in Vienna, in 
which Norsolor was ordered to pay amounts based on transnational rules (essentially a 
splitting of the difference), whereas Turkish and French law would have imposed an “all or 
nothing” result. 
16 As a critic of lex mercatoria, Francis Mann once observed, “No merchant of any 
experience would ever be prepared to submit to the unforeseeable consequences which arise 
from application of undefined and undefinable standards described as rules of a lex of 
unknown origin.” F. A. Mann, Introduction, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A 
DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT xxi (Thomas Carbonnau ed., 1990); see also F.A. 
Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN 
DOMKE 157 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1967).  
17 The two titans, Professor Berthold Goldman and Dr. F.A. Mann, wrote dueling 
introductions to a collection of essays on lex mercatoria: Goldman “for” and Mann “against”. 
See LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION xv-xxi (Thomas Carbonneau ed.,  rev. ed. 1998) 
(Goldman and Mann introductions). A few years earlier, the author of this present essay, then 
a beginner, had been privileged to sit with these men at a conference dinner, one on the left 
and the other on the right. Presumptuously, that neophyte had written on lex mercatoria and 
“delocalization” of arbitration, favoring the views of Dr. Mann and expressing concern about 
the prospect that “transnational” notions might serve as fig leaves to hide unauthorized 
substitution of arbitrators’ private preferences for properly applicable law. As wine was 
poured, Goldman looked to Mann with a smile and said, “Francis, between us sits the only 
living disciple of your non-theory.” 
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II. THE DEVIL IN DETAIL: WHEN AND HOW DO DIFFERENCES MATTER? 
A. What is at Stake? 
When (and why) should it matter whether international law is truly 
international? In law, as in the rest of life, the devil often remains in the details. 
Efforts to understand the cross-cultural dimensions of international law get a 
boost by looking at concrete examples of the impact of language and civilization 
on specific legal norms. 
Perhaps the most accessible illustrations derive from variations in articulation 
and implementation of legal doctrines as between relatively homogeneous legal 
cultures, for example those of France, Britain, and the United States.18 Even in 
this connection, however, perceived “technicalities” (to use a loaded term) 
impede understanding of what really happens in applying legal principles.  
Few antidotes to lazy lawyering exist short of tackling specific illustrations of 
how precise language and culture impact the norms we understand to implicate 
international law. Decorticating these principles often requires patience and a 
perseverance rarely shared except by those in the thick of the controversy.  
B. Three Dilemmas: Treaties, Expropriation, and Jurisdiction 
To help elaborate what remains at stake in understanding variations among 
different notions of international law, let us take three legal dilemmas: (i) the 
fate of annulled arbitration awards, (ii) title to expropriated property, and (iii) 
jurisdiction to tax cross-border transactions. All bear on the “internationality” of 
international law in different ways. 
1. Interpreting Multilateral Treaties: Annulled Arbitral Awards 
To assess whether and how differences matter in international law, one 
starting point might be treaty interpretation. An illustrative scenario might take 
a simple cross-border sales agreement subject to an arbitration clause, with an 
award made in one country presented for enforcement in another. 
Going back to first principles, few would disagree that freely-accepted 
obligations generally deserve respect. If a buyer in New York agrees to pay $10 
million for goods imported from France, the purchaser should not escape 
payment absent some good reason. Who is to determine whether a “good reason” 
does in fact exist? The American buyer might say the merchandise was 
defective, with the French seller maintaining the opposite. Who decides? Does 
the matter go to courts of the importer in the United States or to courts of the 
exporter in France? Or to some supra-national body, such as an arbitral tribunal 
in London? 
In the search for a fair and certain forum, the most common solution would 
be arbitration, at least for international transactions like the one above. To pursue 
 
18 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 254-64 (noting dominance of French and English legal 
cultures, with English ascendant as lingua franca of international law). 
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matters further, let us assume the controversy goes to arbitration in London, as 
agreed by both sides. The arbitral tribunal decides in favor of the French 
seller/exporter: the goods were indeed up to the contractually stipulated quality, 
and the American buyer owes money for failing to pay. Let us posit further that, 
rightly or wrongly, an English court, with jurisdiction based on the seat of the 
arbitral tribunal, vacates the award due to violation of some provision of the 
English arbitration act.19 
When the French winner under the award, now annulled, seeks to have the 
award enforced by attaching the American company’s assets both in New York 
and in Paris, those enforcement courts will need to decide whether to give effect 
to the arbitration award itself, which says that damages must be paid, or to the 
English court judgment setting aside the arbitral award, thus relieving the 
American buyer of its payment obligations pursuant to the arbitration.  
What is to be done? Award enforcement (which in turn engages respect for 
cross-border commitments) implicates one of the most successful instruments of 
international law: the 1958 UN (New York) Convention (the “Convention”),20 
now signed by over 150 states ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.21 The 
Convention provides for recognition of foreign arbitral awards, but with some 
significant caveats, in particular concerning awards annulled in their country of 
origin. These caveats have been applied differently by courts in France, Britain, 
and the United States. Indeed, the Convention language has been applied 
differently even within the United States, with divergence derived not from any 
perversity of judges but from good faith variants in perspectives on how to 
construe the treaty. 
The battle plays itself out, in part, through Article V(1)(e) of the Convention, 
whose application triggers different results depending on whether the word 
“may” gets read as conveying (i) permission or (ii) expectation, a matter that 
sometimes depends on the context of the case or on which of the five official 
language versions gets consulted.22  
The English version of Article V(1)(e) reads:  
 
19 The Arbitration Act might permit annulment, for example, due to a perceived procedural 
irregularity. Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 23 § 68 (UK). Or an award in some instances may be 
set aside following an appeal under Section 69 on a point of law, in this context defined by 
Section 82 to include the law of England and Wales. Id. at §§ 69, 82. 
20 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].  
21 Indeed, except for the letters W and X, signatories include countries beginning with 
every character in the Roman alphabet. The letter Y remains somewhat problematic, since 
Slavic Macedonia often identifies itself by reference to the former Yugoslavia. 
22 Under Convention Article XVI(1), the treaty’s Chinese, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish texts are “equally authentic.” New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. XVI(1). 
On the comparison of treaty texts with different meanings, see Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, art. 33(4), May 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, which provides for adoption of the 
“meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object and purposes of the 
treaty.” 
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 Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request  
 of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes proof  
 that . . . [the award] has been set aside or suspended by a competent  
 authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award  
 was made.23  
In contrast, the French text lends itself to a more forceful interpretation that 
could mandate deference to the annulment court decision, providing that 
recognition and enforcement “will not be refused … unless [que si] … the award 
was annulled or suspended” by a competent authority where that award was 
made:  
 La reconnaissance et l’exécution de la sentence ne seront refusées, sur  
 requête de la partie contre laquelle elle est invoquée que si cette partie  
 fournit à l'autorité compétente du pays où la reconnaissance et  
 l'exécution sont demandées la preuve . . .a été annulée ou suspendue par  
 une autorité compétente du pays dans lequel, ou d’après la loi duquel. la  
 sentence a été rendu.24 
The French text lacks notions of discretion conveyed by “may” in English. 
Rather, the “unless” [“que si” in the original] combined with a future indicative 
(recognition will not be refused) seems to compel expectation of non-
recognition of the annulled award.25  
Thus, an arbitral award annulled in its country of origin could be presented 
for enforcement against assets in other countries, with dramatically different 
results. Courts purporting to apply the very same treaty to the very same facts 
may come to diametrically opposed conclusions.26 
 
23 New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. V(1)(e). 
24 Convention pour la Reconnaissance et l'Exécution des Sentences Arbitrales 
Étrangères, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
25 The mandatory (or expectation) tone in such a future indicative construction might be 
illustrated in a sentence such as, “The scholarships will not be revoked unless (“la bourse ne 
sera révoquée que si…”) the student is found guilty of cheating.” On the “may” vs. “must” 
debate in relation to New York Convention Article V, see generally Richard W. Hulbert,  
Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and an 
Opportunity Foregone, 13 ICSID REV. 124, 144 (1998); Jan Paulsson, May or Must Under 
the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics, 14 ARB. INT’L 227 (1998); 
Georgios Petrochilos, On the Mechanics and Rationale of Enforcing Awards Annulled in their 
State of Origin under the New York Convention, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 858 (1999). 
26 For an interesting twist on competing views about the effect of arbitral awards rendered 
abroad, see Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46. The U.K. Supreme Court refused to enforce an 
ICC award made in Paris, in favor of a Saudi company, reasoning that under French law the 
Pakistani government was not bound by an arbitration agreement signed by a trust the 
government established. A year later, however, a French court came to the opposite 
conclusion in rejecting an application to vacate the award in favor of the Saudi creditor, 
reasoning that the intervention in contract negotiations by officials of the Pakistani 
government meant that the state (not the trust) was in fact the true contracting party (la 
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Scholars and judges in England or the United States often (though not 
always27) see annulment as triggering a universal effect, making an award 
unenforceable wherever presented for enforcement, in essence permitting a 
court at the place of arbitration to uproot an award once and for all. According 
to that view, the Convention contains an implicit understanding that the arbitral 
situs will monitor an arbitration’s procedural integrity, in exchange for which 
other countries will recognize awards that pass muster where rendered.28  
In contrast, French scholars see the Convention as providing considerably 
more leeway and discretion, with recognition of the award (rather than the 
annulment decision) proving the rule rather than the exception due to invocation 
of a part of the Convention other than Article V(1)(e) as mentioned above.  
French courts look to its Article VII which provides that the treaty shall not 
deprive any interested party of a right to avail itself of an arbitral award in the 
manner allowed by the law where the award has been relied upon. The French 
judiciary thus gives effect to vacated awards under the national law of France, 
as enforcement forum. Such shift of emphasis implicates the influence of 
theories of “a-national” arbitration and “lex mercatoria” espoused by Gallic 
scholars such as Emmanuel Gaillard, along with the late Philippe Fouchard and 
the late Berthold Goldman.29  
 
véritable partie pakistanaise lors de l’opération économique). See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Feb. 17, 2011, [09/28533] (Fr.). 
27 Compare Thai-Lao Lignite (Thail.) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
864 F. 3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017) (deferring to Malaysian court judgment annulling arbitral award 
made in Malaysia); TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 939 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (deferring to annulment in Colombia of award made in Bogotá); Baker Marine, Ltd. v. 
Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1999) (deferring to Nigerian court vacatur of 
arbitral award made in Lagos); with In re Int’l Betchel Co., 300 F.Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 
2004) (refusing to enforce award annulled for failure to administer oath invoking God 
Almighty as required by UAE law, at time when UAE had not signed New York Convention). 
But see Chromalloy v. Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 907, 914 (D.D.C. 1996) (vacating Cairo tribunal’s 
award of damages for tribunal’s alleged failure to apply correct law). In an opinion with no 
American precedent at that time, the court reasoned that error of law did not constitute a 
ground for vacatur in the United States, thus permitting award enforcement. See also 
Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex–Exploración y Producción, 832 
F.3d 92, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing annulled award rather than annulment). 
28 Albert Jan van den Berg, Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 133, 137 (R. Lillich & C. Brower eds., 
1994); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 355-58 (1981); 
W. Laurence Craig,  Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L LAW J. 1, 58 (1995); see also W. 
Michael Reisman, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 113-20 (1992). 
29 See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITE DE 
L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL §§ 270, 1595, 1687-89 (1996); Philippe Fouchard, 
La Portée Internationale de l’Annulation de la Sentence Arbitrale dans son Pays d’Origine, 
1997 REV. ARB. 329 (1997). For later and earlier debate on the matter, see authorities cited in 
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The French view received its most classic expression in the Hilmarton case,30 
a many faceted saga where an arbitrator in Geneva denied a claim for consulting 
fees, erroneously believing that the contract violated Switzerland’s public 
policy.31 After a cantonal court vacated the award on the basis of this mistake, a 
second arbitral tribunal gave damages to the claimant.32 In France, both awards 
were recognized, each in a separate proceeding: first the annulled award in favor 
of the defendant;33 then the award in the second arbitration in favor of the 
claimant.34 Ultimately the Cour de Cassation held that the first judgment, 
 
Emmanuel Gaillard, The Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin, 14 ICSID 
REV. 16 (1999); William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. 
J. INT’L LAW 805 (1999); William W. Park, Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award 
Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Jan 
Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters, 
32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983).  
30  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], Civ., Hilmarton v. 
OTV, June 10, 1997, note Ph. Fouchard (Fr.) [hereinafter Hilmarton 1997]. See generally 
Georges Delaume, Enforcement Against a Foreign State of an Arbitral Award Annulled in the 
Foreign State, 1997 REV. DROIT DES AFFAIRES INT. 253 (1997); Philippe Fouchard, La Portée 
Internationale de l’Annulation de la Sentence Arbitrale dans son Pays d’Origine, 1997 REV. 
ARB. 329 (1997); Jan Paulsson,  Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard 
Annulment, 6 ASIAN PAC. L. REV. 1 (1998); Jean-François Poudret, Quelle Solution Pour en 
Finir avec L’Affaire Hilmarton?, 1998 REV. ARB. 7 (1998); Eric Schwartz, French Supreme 
Court Renders Final Judgment in the Hilmarton Case, 1997 INT’L ARB. L.R. 45 (1997). For 
an earlier decision along these lines, see Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for 
Judicial Matters], Oct. 9 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.) (award vacated in Austria enforceable in 
France). 
31 The consultant successfully helped obtain a contract for drainage in Algiers. While there 
was no allegation of bribery, the consultant’s activity allegedly ran afoul of an Algerian statute 
on commercial intermediaries.  
32 The award was rendered in August 1988 and thus subject to challenge for “arbitrariness” 
under Article 36 of the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat. Since January 1989, awards in 
international arbitration would normally be subject to the Loi fédérale sur le droit 
internationale privé (“LDIP”). Upheld by the Swiss Tribunal fédéral, the Geneva court found 
that the conflict with Algerian legislation did not constitute a violation of Swiss public policy. 
See Tribunal fédéral [TF] Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 17, 1990 (Switz.); Court de Justice 
[Court of Justice] Geneva, Nov. 17, 1989, 322 (Switz.). 
33 Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 19, 1991, 90-16778 (relying 
on NCPC arts. 1498 & 1502, which limit appeal against award recognition to grounds that do 
not include annulment of award where rendered). The appellate court’s judgment was upheld 
by the Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Mar. 23, 1994, 92-
15.137, note Jarrosson (Fr.) [hereinafter Hilmarton 1994]. See generally Vincent Heuzé, La 
Morale, L’Arbitre et Le Juge, 1993 REV. ARB. 179 (1993). 
34 The order of the Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance, which recognized the second 
award (as well as the Swiss court’s annulment of the first award), was confirmed by the 
Versailles Cour d’Appel on June 29, 1995. Cour d’Appel [CA][regional court of appeal] 
Versailles, June 29, 1995. 
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recognizing the annulled award, prevented recognition of the second arbitral 
award.35 Although the position of the French Cour de Cassation on res judicata 
is understandable, its reasoning may be less so in concluding that international 
arbitrations were not integrated into the legal order of the arbitral situs.36  
Of course, even the English text of the Convention with its permissive “may” 
(“recognition … may be refused”) leaves open a mandatory meaning. The verb 
“may” in that context does not easily read as an acceptance of equally viable 
options, as in, “You may have vanilla ice cream for dessert or you may have 
apple pie.” Rather, the “may” carries a sense of expectation, as in “You may 
worship according to the dictates of your own conscience.” The context of 
Article V(1) makes clear such an “expectation” – at least if one considers the 
other listed items for which recognition “may” be refused: for an agreement that 
is not valid; for absence of proper notice; for a denial of one side’s right to 
present its case; for an award beyond the submission to arbitration; and for an 
arbitral tribunal composed contrary to the parties’ agreement.37  
Some looking at the dispute from outside the practical context (seller vs. 
buyer) may roll their eyes in respect of nuances in wording from one text to 
another. However, for those in the thick of the action, it will be justice and equity 
(not “technicalities”) that get furthered or denied, depending on whether effect 
is given to the arbitral award supporting the seller/exporter or the French court 
decision in favor of the buyer/importer. The seller will say, “Where is the justice 
in denying the arbitrators’ clear decision?” The buyer will retort, “Where is the 
equity in disregarding a ruling of the English court?” 
In short, general discussions of international law, as juxtaposing human rights 
against state sovereignty and equality,38 take meaning only in concrete cases, 
some of which prove quite mundane, except to those whose welfare and fortunes 
remain in jeopardy. In the narrative set forth above, human rights include an 
entitlement to be paid (for the seller), just as state sovereignty (for the seller) 
implicates respect for the judicial decisions at the place of arbitration.  
2. Expropriated Property: The Act of State Doctrine 
Outside the realm of treaty interpretation, differences in international law may 
arise when one country purports to expropriate property initially held by a 
resident of another nation, with the seized assets ultimately finding their way to 
another nation with less revolutionary notions of property law. The so-called 
 
35 Hilmarton 1997, supra note 30. 
36 See Hilmarton 1994, supra note 33 (affirming lower court’s recognition of annulled 
award and stating that Geneva award “n’était pas intégrée à l’ordre juridique de [la Suisse]”). 
In Hilmarton, the ultimate result of recognizing the annulled award was that the claimant who 
prevailed at the bargained-for situs was hindered in obtaining unpaid fees.  
37 See New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. V(1) (a)-(d). 
38 In this connection, see ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 286-91 (discussing how China and 
Russia may resist certain aspects of Western legal order, in particular through 2016 joint 
declarations reflecting their views on United Nations Charter and 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law). 
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“Act of State Doctrine” presents an illustration of national differences even 
among closely-related legal systems, Britain and the United States, relating more 
to reasoning than to result. In the British matter, an enterprise operating a 
sawmill in Russia before the 1917 Revolution found its wood seized by the 
Bolsheviks and sold to a competitor in England.39 In an analogous case arising 
in the United States, an American firm with plantations in Cuba saw its sugar 
confiscated after Fidel Castro’s Communist government took power in 1959, 
with title to the dispossessed cargo ending up in New York through the form of 
a “bill of lading” held in that state.40 
Who ultimately owns the lumber or the sugar? In Britain, the matter was 
addressed essentially as a choice-of-law problem, with title to property 
depending on its situs, determined according to rules fixed by the recognized 
government of that territory. His Majesty’s Government had recognized the 
Soviet Union as the government of Russia,41 leading an English court to find 
that the Soviets had rights to the Russian-situated lumber, such rights being 
granted to a buyer that purchased the wood after it had been taken from its 
original owner.  
While similar in result, the American and British approaches to analogous 
expropriations contrast sharply in reasoning. In the United States, pursuant to 
the so-called Sabbatino principle,42 a simple choice-of-law principle 
transformed itself into a doctrine of Constitutional dimension, providing 
opportunities for tenure-hungry academics to pen sophisticated and nuanced law 
review commentaries. The United States Supreme Court addressed 
expropriation of a cargo of sugar taken by the newly instituted Castro 
government, which had dispossessed the owners of an American-owned 
corporation. When the bill of lading (representing title to the sugar) ended up in 
New York, the United States Supreme Court sustained the expropriation decree 
of the Cuban government on the basis of an “Act of State Doctrine” that 
precludes courts from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of recognized 
foreign sovereigns committed within their own territory.43  An opinion by Justice 
Harlan saw “constitutional underpinnings” for the doctrine, in the form of 
separation of powers principles precluding the judiciary from passing on the 
 
39 See generally Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1. K.B. 456 (UK). 
40 See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
41 Luther, supra note 39, at 456. James Sagor & Company had purchased wood from the 
Soviet regime that had expropriated the lumber from its original owner, the A.M. Luther 
Company. Title to wood, shipped to England, had been claimed by both the Soviet 
government and the owners whose factory had been nationalized. 
42 Sabbatino, supra note 40, at 427-37. 
43 Id. at 438. The name of the case derived from one Peter Sabbatino, who had been 
appointed receiver for the New York assets of the expropriated sugar company, which the 
Banco Nacional de Cuba had received by assignment from the agent for the Cuban 
Government, and which were later delivered to the French bank Société Générale for 
presentment to the purchaser. Id. at 406. 
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validity of foreign acts in a fashion that hinders conduct of international relations 
by the executive branch of government.44 
As with the matter of annulled awards, this stark difference in approach 
occurs not because of any divide between Eastern and Western legal cultures. 
Rather, two nations with long and close cultural ties, plus similar legal traditions, 
diverged in articulating analogous international law principles, in part by reason 
of how one judiciary interpreted its own constitution.  
3. Allocating Fiscal Jurisdiction 
A third example presents itself from the tax field, which surprisingly often 
finds itself unexplored by jurists focused on public international law. One says 
“surprisingly” because tax implicates the most universal of topics, generating 
regular international disputes and governed by thousands of treaties, including 
“model” conventions issued by supra-national organizations such as the United 
Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”). 
Most of these treaties include “MAP” mechanisms providing “mutual 
agreement procedures” directing negotiation of differences on taxation of profits 
that touch more than one nation. For example, a royalty payment might be made 
by a French subsidiary to its American parent. As between the French and 
American tax authorities, different views might exist on the correct amount of 
royalty. The French government, concerned with the royalty as a deduction from 
income, might say the “arm’s length” rate would be 3% only. The United States 
government, looking to increase revenue to the parent corporation, might impose 
tax on a deemed royalty received of 7% of the income generated in France.  
The multinational enterprise remains a stake-holder, generally most 
concerned that the income in the United States be matched by a corresponding 
deduction in France, hoping that the two national tax authorities would agree, 
whether on 3%, 7%, or something in between. And indeed, from a perspective 
of logic, such must be the case. The lack of agreement between the two 
governments means that the total taxed income in France and the United States 
will be more than the real income in these two countries.45 
 
44 Id. at 423. Of note in this connection is a provision of the Federal Arbitration Act 
explicitly making the Act of State doctrine inapplicable in respect of enforcing arbitration 
agreements or confirming arbitration awards. 9 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). Presumably, the 
“separation of powers” argument would not apply given that arbitrators serve as private rather 
than public judges. This provision has sometimes been referred to as part of the “LIAMCO 
Amendments” to both the Federal Arbitration Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
following the disappointing reasoning in LIAMCO v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 
1980), vacated D.C. Cir., 6 May 1981 (Order No. 80-1207). 
45 Assume that the amount of income in France from the licensed patent equals $100 before 
the royalty. If the French take a deduction of 5%, then the income would be $95. If the United 
States recognizes the 5% royalty received by the American parent, then the total income 
comes to $100: $95 in France, and $5 in the United States. However, if the French reduce to 
3% the royalty recognized for tax purposes, and the Americans increase to 7% the royalty 
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Although not double taxation in a juridical sense (given the separate corporate 
personalities of parent and subsidiary), such situations present economic double 
taxation. The same income might be taxed twice, to the extent that an inclusion 
in the American company’s taxable profits has not been offset by a 
corresponding deduction in France. The multinational enterprise acts as 
stakeholder, ready to pay tax either to the United States or to France but not to 
both countries.  
Tax treaty arbitration provides one hope for fiscal symmetry, thereby 
reducing the fiscal barriers to cross-border trade and investment. To meet the 
challenge of such double taxation of cross-border transactions, the OECD model 
bilateral tax treaty46 initially attempted to address this issue by providing a 
mutual agreement procedure under Article 25 to resolve disputes between tax 
authorities, investors, and states about double taxation and tax loopholes. 
However, binding arbitration proves only an option: a permissible “may” to 
arbitrate – but not a mandatory “must” to resolve the differences. Some treaties 
have been amended in 2008 to require mandatory arbitration if negotiations 
fail.47 Finally, the OECD initiated a project addressing “Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting” (“BEPS”), resulting in a multilateral instrument with refinements to 
mutual agreement procedures. While an “Action 14” of the BEPS initiative 
recommended commitment to provide for mandatory binding arbitration in the 
bilateral tax treaties as a mechanism to guarantee that treaty-related disputes will 
be resolved within a specified timeframe, the multilateral instrument itself left 
arbitration as an option, not a requirement. 
A fifteenth item in the BEPS Action Plan bears the somewhat cumbersome 
title, “Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties.” 
Such a multinational instrument was signed in 2017,48 including two options. A 
 
deemed received in the United States, the thoughtful observer finds a total of $104 in income 
taxed ($97 in France and $7 in the United States), when the initial income pie came to only 
$100 in total. 
46 OECD,  MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-
condensed-version-20745419.htm [https://perma.cc/99E8-MTLD]. 
47 The earliest income tax treaty containing an arbitration provision appears to be the 1926 
United Kingdom-Irish Free State Convention, which in Article 7 provides that questions on 
interpretation of the treaty “shall be determined by such tribunal as may be agreed between 
them [the Parties], and the determination of such tribunal shall, as between them, be final.” 
Finance Act, 1926 (No. 35/1926) (Ir.),  
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1926/act/35/schedule/1/enacted/en/html 
[https://perma.cc/QF46-KPT4]. 
48 The Multilateral Instrument itself was promulgated on November 24, 2016, followed by 
a signing ceremony in Paris on June 7, 2017. OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement 
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Jul. 1, 2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-
measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3U8-72F7].  To date, approximately 
seventy countries have signed the instrument, although none has yet concluded ratification. 
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traditional process tells competent governmental authorities to “endeavor” to 
resolve taxation considered not in accordance with the treaty, with the chips 
falling where they may in the event of no agreement. A more forceful Part VI of 
that multilateral instrument (from Articles 18 through 26) provides a process for 
mandatory binding arbitration of controversies as to which the competent 
authorities were unable to reach agreement.  
For better or for worse, the arbitration provision of that multilateral instrument 
fixes a form of “baseball arbitration” with an unreasoned decision, with Article 
23(1)(c) providing as follows: 
 The arbitration panel shall select as its decision one of the proposed  
 resolutions for the case submitted by the competent authorities with  
 respect to each issue and any threshold questions, and shall not include a  
 rationale or any other explanation of the decision. The arbitration  
 decision will be adopted by a simple majority of the panel members. The  
 arbitration panel shall deliver its decision in writing to the competent  
 authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions. The arbitration decision shall  
 have no precedential value.49 
This OECD BEPS initiative, although far from universally accepted, provides 
an example of where international law does in fact reach toward an international 
character. The aspiration realizes itself through a combination of multilateral 
negotiation and bilateral treaties. 
III. LOOKING FORWARD: STORIES FOR ANOTHER DAY 
Asking whether international law is international will to some extent prove a 
matter of vocabulary. Whether chess is a “game” depends on whether that notion 
includes only vigorous physical activity with a roundish object, such as baseball, 
basketball, tennis, football, and squash. If so, chess would be out of 
consideration. By contrast, however, a wider notion of “game” might include the 
type of diversion and competition that comprises a sixty-four square board 
designed for moving figurines designated as king, queen, rook, knight, bishop, 
and pawn. Those who wish to limit the notion of “game” may of course choose 
not to include chess. 
Different parts of the world include divergent notions of cross-border norms 
in their lexicon of international law. Some limit the field to the type of custom 
 
Notably, the United States did not sign the instrument, although American delegates 
participated actively in the BEPS process. 
49 Id. at art. 23(1)(c). In setting compensation of major league American ballplayers in the 
United States, the late winter finds baseball players often asking for more than the teams wish 
to pay. The “baseball” approach to arbitration requires each side to submit to arbitration its 
“last best offer” – from which arbitrators must choose one position or the other. Faced with 
the prospect of an arbitrator who will see things with a relative amount of realism, the player 
becomes more modest and the team more generous. As the player moves from a request for 
$10 to a request for $6, and the team budges from its offer of $3 to a proposal of $5.5, the two 
sides find a common ground that permits last-minute settlement. 
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or treaty recognized as binding one nation in its relations with another among 
so-called “civilized nations” as initially recognized by Western Europe. Others 
go further, and include notions of fairness (ex aequo et bono or amiable 
composition) by which a court or arbitrator decides in a way that seems to it fair 
and good, full stop. Such “public” international law distinguishes itself in many 
academic traditions from the somewhat distinct (yet overlapping) field of 
“private” international law (often called “conflict of laws”) looking to principles 
on choice-of-law, enforcement of foreign judgments, and jurisdiction, both 
legislative and adjudicatory. Also considered a separate field of study, the realm 
of “international business transactions” touches public and private notions of 
law, as well as national legal rules which touch transactions that cross-national 
borders, such as investments, finance, and taxation. 
International lawyers have been blessed to live in exhilarating times. The 
book by Professor Roberts leaves us with many questions. Will we see 
convergence of scholarship and legal theory from different nations? Will Europe 
and North America become more like China and Russia? Or the reverse? What 
time of convergence would enhance net global welfare? Answers, of course, 
depend on context: sometimes yes, sometimes no, and sometimes maybe. As 
Rudyard Kipling might have written, these remain stories for another day. 
 
